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INTRODUCTION
There was once a man who fell asleep while sitting in an 
armchair in front of his living room fire. To his horror, he 
woke to find that his feet had been badly damaged by 
the fire. They had been too close, but he had felt nothing: 
some years before, he had become paralysed in a mo-
torcycle accident—he was now ‘blind’ to the sensation of 
pain in his legs and feet. I also recall an occasion when 
I locked eyes with a gorilla in a zoo. There seemed to be 
a certain understanding between us—a shared experi-
ence maybe. But there was also an unfathomable depth 
of puzzlement, or unknowing. In a similar vein, I recall 
seeing an insect, with apparent speed of purpose, traver-
sing the great expanse of my living room floor in blissful 
ignorance that it was in an inhospitable desert with no 
hope of survival. In each case there is knowing and yet 
an absence of knowing.
I am mentioning each of these occasions by way of 
introduction to the possibility that humanity is actually 
also blind to a certain way of knowing: humans have 
a certain blindness in much the same way as the insect, 
 
the ape or the paralysed man. In each example, it is not 
known by the subject that there is an unknowing—think 
of the insect or the ape who appear not to know of the 
‘wider picture’. And the paralysed man too is tragically 
unknowing of the situation before him. In this paper, I will 
make the case that it is within humanity’s capabilities to 
know reality on a different ontological plane; humanity 
need not have the blindness.
BACKGROUND
Pharoah 2018 talks of three differentiated (ontologically 
distinct) classes of interactive discourse. Each class 
determines an entirely distinct category of meaningful 
relation between the interacting subject and its world. 
The overall picture he proposes is that the meaning-
ful relations in each class qualify distinct categories 
of knowing about the world. Those classes of which 
he speaks are the physiological, the phenomenal, and 
the conceptual.
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aningful physiological structures, forms, functions, and qualitative ascriptions. Second, there is phenomenal 
knowledge which is qualified by the utilisation of real-time experience to effect an individuated spatiotemporal 
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and structuring. This will demand a transdisciplinary and multimodal approach.
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In relation to the physiological, replication facilitates 
a generational discourse which determines a meaningful 
lineage–environment correspondence. This results in 
the evolution of biochemical capacities that assimilate 
environmental particulars in such a way that determines 
a unique and meaningful physiological knowledge cate-
gory. Importantly, this meaning includes the qualitative 
ascription to the physical. All innate behaviours are in-
formed by this category of knowing which has evolved 
over many generations.
In the case of the phenomenal, neural mechanisms 
have the capability to prioritise the individual’s biochemi-
cally assimilated environment. This characterises a me-
aningful and constantly changing experiential discourse. 
The individual creature thereby possesses a qualitatively 
delineated spatiotemporal world-view that qualifies the 
character of its phenomenal experience. This process 
defines a uniquely subjective phenomenal knowledge 
category which evolves from one experiential moment 
to the next.
Thirdly, with the conceptual, cognitive mechanisms 
facilitate the development of abstracted principles con-
cerning a spatiotemporal and rule-bound world. This 
generates an introspective inquiry concerning the exis-
tential nature of the subject’s relationship with the world 
and qualifies a conceptually constructed knowledge ca-
tegory which informs intrapersonal, cultural and social 
stances, prejudices and ideologies. 
Each category in the hierarchy requires the imple-
mentation of a distinctive mechanism of environmental 
engagement. In effect, there is an emergent hierarchy 
of evolving categories delineated by the nature of their 
mechanism of environmental engagement. Each mecha-
nism of environmental engagement justifies its existence, 
importantly, where it bears some pertinent meaningful 
correspondence with the environment. 
In Pharoah’s (2018) summary, he goes on to state:
To say there is a hierarchy implies that it [the hierarchy] 
probably extends in both directions to more basal and 
to higher levels—I have detailed only three levels in this 
paper, namely, the physiological, phenomenal and con-
ceptual. But by extension, one can surmise that in the 
downward direction we have the precursor to replicating 
forms whose ontological distinctions are described by 
classical physics and, a level further down, by quantum 
physics. In the opposite upward direction, we can sur-
mise that there is likely to be another category in the hi-
erarchy that is yet to emerge from the human existential 
world-view. (Pharoah 2018, 443)
So if we are talking of distinct classes of knowing, 
Pharoah is saying that the hierarchical nature of his mo-
del indicates that there is another class of knowing that 
extends beyond the conceptual to which humans are cu-
rrently ignorant (or blind)—as intimated in the introduction.
In the cases of the insect, ape, and paralysed man, 
there is some kind of knowing between the subject and 
the object of experience that is diminished or impoveris-
hed. What Pharoah indicates is that humans also have 
an impoverished world-view because the next ontologi-
cally delineated hierarchical level has not yet emerged.
LANGUAGE AND DISCOURSE
Language is not mentioned in Pharoah’s paper. Rather 
he talks about discourse in the broadest terms: “In my 
view, meaning cannot be acquired without some kind 
of mechanism of discourse, where a mechanism of 
discourse is one that is capable of assigning value…” 
(431). His argument is that discourse can be said to take 
place where any kind of interactive mechanism creates 
meaning whose value is justified in some way. 
Under this broad definition, discourse does not prede-
termine ‘that which is communicated’. Rather, ‘that which 
is communicated’, namely ‘meaning’, is qualified by some 
process of justification. Importantly, this justification 
process is unconnected to the mechanism of discourse 
itself (cf. Putnam 2008 on the view that discourse and 
communication are separate but interrelated constructs). 
What this means is that when an agent engages in inte-
ractive discourse, it cannot control the character of the 
meaningful outcome. This is true of all the different types 
of communication in the proposed hierarchy. 
In its broader interpretation, all categories of discourse 
require a mechanism that makes interaction possible, and 
a vehicle of transmission. For instance, DNA, through the 
mechanism of replication, is the principle vehicle that ma-
kes possible the discourse between a replicating lineage 
and the environment over a generational timeline. Note, 
there is no implicit meaning ‘carried’ by DNA. The meaning 
is qualified by a separate uncontrolled process of valida-
tion and justification. This maintains a kind of ‘ontological 
divide,’ or perhaps a causal divide, between the genotype 
and the phenotype. 
In the case of phenomenal experience, neural mecha-
nisms (mostly unidentified to science) facilitate a real-
-time experiential discourse. The vehicle of transmission 
is the individual’s entire afferent–efferent neural system 
which engages the environment. The meaningful subjec-
tive world-view of the individual creature is a reflection 
of the impact of the environment–creature discourse 
which includes the perceptual–behavioural complex. 
Once again, a creature’s phenomenal knowledge, in its 
entirety, is qualified by a separate uncontrolled process 
of validation and justification that maintains the divide 
between phenomenal content and the functions of the 
neural network. 
In each case, what might be understood as ‘that 
which is communicated through interactive discourse’ 
takes on a very different category of meaning. Interes-
tingly, the communication is both internal, that is, main-
tained as part of the construct of the subject (or agent), 
and external to the subject, where ‘external’ means that 
it extends into the wider environment. So there is this 
bifold idea of a construct that perpetuates over time, and 
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a fluid open discourse. Additionally, there is the crucial 
notion of a divide between the mechanism of discourse 
and that which validates.
Human language is a more familiar example. Lan-
guages are thought of as a form of communication: 
communicating is the purpose of language. But human 
languages are primarily an evocation of an individu-
al’s  introspective interpretations of reality (or a rendi-
tion of the individual’s ‘cognitive schemata’), where the 
communication itself is only part of those introspective 
considerations and interpretations. Language becomes 
part of the vehicle of introspective discourse when there 
are other humans with whom those thought processes 
can be shared and discussed—noting the broader signi-
ficance of introspective creativity and social semiotics 
(Hodge & Kress 1988). Discourse is the introspective 
activity, while language is the vehicle which promotes 
meaningful engagement, both internally and externally. 
But, as with the other examples, the activity and the 
vehicle do not determine the meaning—information is 
not something that is transferred from one to the other. 
There is an indeterminacy of meaning (notably, this 
applies not just to translation but to discursive langu-
age generally—consider Zolyan 2017). In other words, 
the meaning is, ultimately, an approximated contextual 
construct that is validated and justified by separate and 
unconnected processes. One example of a formalised 
process of validation is the scientific method. Of course, 
the extensive body of existing scientific knowledge and 
its evolutionary development is not controlled by our 
personal introspections and utterances. This fact con-
forms to the idea that there is an ontological/causal 
divide that undoubtedly frustrates all those wishing to 
steer the course of human knowledge and development.
EQUILIBRIA AND STABILITY
Pharoah does not mention in his paper the role of equi-
libria and stability either. But it is an important conside-
ration if one is to explore the next hierarchical level of 
knowing to which humanity is currently blind: 
One of the principle ideas of any state of equilib-
rium is that it remains in equilibrium until some conflic-
ting impulse motivates change. If we apply this idea to 
discourse and justification, we can note that when me-
aning is justified by some process, then that meaning 
represents a stable truism that remains so until such 
a time that it is no longer the case. In this way, we can 
consider different classes of knowledge as being mea-
ningfully coherent and an accurate reflection of reality, 
and in being so, to be stable (or, to be in a state of equi-
librium). This remains the case until such time as the 
reliability of that meaningful knowing becomes challen-
ged or irrelevant. A subsequent rebalancing of stability 
is necessarily indicative of the degree to which meaning 
requires recalibration. In this way, meaning acquisition is 
not motivated by incompleteness per se (Deacon 2012), 
for which there is no absolute authority, but by instability. 
For each category—those being the physiological, the 
phenomenal and the conceptual—this variation in the 
degree (or extent) of instability is reflected in the rate 
of physiological, behavioural, and introspective adapta-
tion, respectively. With each, there is a commensurable 
evolutionary gradient that reflects the dynamism of the 
changing environment–agent relation that is particular 
to each of the respective classes (‘agent’ here refers to 
the replicating lineage, the individual creature, or the hu-
man’s conceptual stance, respectively). 
Notably, to some extent all equilibria resist desta-
bilising influences. Inevitably, however, for each class, 
stability is always being challenged and evolutionary 
adaptation takes place, be it physiological, behaviou-
ral, or conceptual. Consequently, a species will tend to 
evolve when conditions make prescient survival demands 
(Kashtan et al. 2007); a creature will adapt its behaviours 
(i.e. to learn) more readily when conditions undermine 
what it understands to be the case; a human will tend to 
think more broadly when the coherence of its stance is 
destabilised and a stable transitional alternative comes 
into focus.
And, as was mentioned previously, the justification 
that controls the evolution of meaning, in each class, is 
not controlled by the agent: a species does not control 
its evolution; a creature does not control what it learns; 
a human being does not control its conceptual stance 
or human knowledge. But in each case, what the agent 
does, does affect the dynamic of evolutionary adaptation 
(broadly construed) according to a complex dynamic of 
influences and effects (consider Sharov 2016, 2017 on 
the reciprocal influence on evolution of agent scaffolding 
and constraints).
MOVING FORWARD TO THE 
NEXT HIERARCHICAL CATEGORY 
OF KNOWING REALITY
In each class, a distinct category of knowing evolves 
in a way that is uncontrolled by the agent because the 
process that justifies the validity of that meaning is se-
parate. What is notable, however, is that the emergence 
of each new level leads to the capability to control what 
was previously uncontrolled at the level below. Let us look 
at each level in turn:
While the individuals of species possess innately 
acquired physiological knowledge, they remain incapable 
of controlling the behaviours which are informed by their 
innate inclinations. But, at the next hierarchical level (the 
phenomenal), the individual has gained the capacity to 
moderate its innate inclinations in virtue of being able 
to learn from experience; it can control what previously 
was not controlled (namely, its behavioural responses 
to varying environmental conditions). 
Although such creatures do learn from experience, 
they cannot control the learning process itself; they do 
not control what they learn. But with the emergence of 
the next hierarchical level (the conceptual), the individual 
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human being has gained the capacity to control the lear-
ning process. It does this by being creative in its appli-
cation to learning. This is what abstract introspection 
facilitates; it facilitates a control over the learning pro-
cess. Human behaviour reflects this capability.
Even so, humans are not able to control or harness 
creativity in a way that controls the dynamic of its intro-
spections and the dynamic of human knowledge acqu-
isition (Rozov 2012). The human is blind to this capabi-
lity. I propose that the emergence of the next level in the 
hierarchy will make these controls possible.
Importantly, this capability to harness or control the 
dynamic of human introspection and knowledge acqui-
sition is not just a different way of organising knowledge, 
of systemising human endeavour or of structuring infor-
mation. It is not a simple change in the way we operate 
either as humans or as a global society. Rather, it is an 
ontologically distinct capability: a revelatory way of being 
in the world and observing reality. It is a new kind of me-
aning and knowledge about reality. “Humanity’s steering 
of the future must involve going beyond humanity in 
some sense” (Rickles 2016, 49).
CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE
So, we as humans are on one side of a divide, and on 
the other side is the goal. In a way, we are like the ape in 
the zoo looking into the eyes of the future of humanity: 
“There seems to be a certain understanding between us, 
a shared experience maybe. But there is also an unfatho-
mable depth of puzzlement, or unknowing.” Where do we 
go from here?
What is required is a significant transdisciplinary pro-
gram of theoretical research (Polis 1993). When we say 
of humans that they strive for knowledge, what we rea-
lly mean is that they strive for an understanding of the 
nature of reality that is conceptual in construction. Each 
of us has an ideological stance to the world that is con-
structed from a network of conceptual principles that, in 
turn, are incorporated into social forms (Pólos et al. 2002). 
In my view then, we need to start with ‘the concept’. We 
need to examine the dynamic of concept formation and 
construction and determine how they relate to each other 
in a network of connective principles about reality. For 
instance, some concepts are restricted by the boundaries 
of our phenomenal knowledge and our innate physiolo-
gical knowledge. Others reflect the nature of our social 
discourse and communications. Some conceptual appa-
ratuses are centred around maintaining a stable view of 
the world and our place in it and, from there, connect 
with our emotions. Many, such as those formulated in 
mathematics and logic, are pure abstractions—abstracti-
ons founded on quantitative and qualitative axioms. Seen 
together, they form a whole. They form a whole that qua-
lifies the construct of the individual self—as it ‘sees’ itself 
and the world in which it exists. It is this ‘seeing’ that can 
be augmented and extended.
Understanding the different categories of concept 
and their dynamic relationships will give insights into 
what determines ideological equilibria. Such an under-
standing will determine the root knowledge underpinning 
the ideology of prejudice, bias, tolerance, and creativity, 
thereby heightening any given individual human’s ability 
to ‘see’ the mind of her/his fellow human and interpret 
their contribution to a global society. The ultimate goal 
would be to enable humanity to steer the evolution of 
human knowledge in a unique and positive way.
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